The Palgrave Handbook of Leisure Theory
Acknowledgements

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Unproductive Leisure and Resented Work: A Brief Incursion in Hegel (and in Nietzsche)

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Introduction

To consider the role of leisure, according to Hegel, primarily requires a reflection on the centrality that the Lord/Slave dialectic occupies in the construction of The Phenomenology of Spirit and later in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. It is, in fact, a kind of double-sided mirror, one concave and the other convex, in which we can see the relationship between work and leisure in Hegel: for the Lord, all play and no work; for the Slave, all work and no play.

And yet, is it through work and not through leisure that the subject realises what he potentially is, through the dialectical movement directed towards a resisting world that he transforms by his work. Thus, as we shall see in the following reflection, Hegel does not see any virtuality of subjectivity in the leisure activities of the Lord, for everything to him (including the Slave himself) is but an object, purely instrumental things.

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In order to understand in greater depth, the type of conception of leisure (and of work) in Hegel, we decided to contrast it, where relevant, with that which became Nietzsche's concept of work and leisure (or otium, as leisure is designated in relation to Ancient Greek culture), to verify whether Hegel's concept of leisure is Modern, Nietzsche’s theorisation develops what is already a postmodern concept.

In the following text, our primary aim was to show how approaching the notion of leisure cannot prevent a dialogue that has been historically instituted, from Ancient Greece, between Slave and Lord, between work and leisure. Hegel masterfully poses the issue to describe the dialectic, which makes the work transforming and turns leisure into slavery.

Secondly, in addressing the problem of subjective recognition, we examine the reasons why only work is liberating, describing in detail the dialectical process that occurs in the confrontation between consciousness desiring mutual recognition, without desiring mutual annihilation.

Thus, by showing the way in which two conflicting desires of conscience can be resolved through the process of recognition, in the final section of this text we present (resented, according to Nietzsche), while the other, the desire of the Lord, is the only acceptable desire, but without the possibility of recognition.

Finally, we conclude—in line with Gorz and Lafargue—that is it necessary to rethink the concepts of leisure and work in the light of a new conception of temporality, to discuss the profound political implications that the Hegelian vision of work and leisure still bears on contemporary societies.

The Absolute Idealism of Hegel

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) is one of modernity’s most important philosophers, for having tried to establish an idealistic philosophy as a foundational understanding of all other types of knowledge. As he himself affirms in his greatest work, The Phenomenology of the Spirit, written in 1807.

Philosophy is frequently taken to be a purely formal kind of knowledge, void of content, and the insight is sadly lacking that, whatever truth there may be in the content of any discipline or science, it can only deserve the name if such truth has been engendered by philosophy.

(1977, p. 41)

In fact, in the history of western philosophy, Hegel constitutes a point of arrival for the development of German idealism, reaching its system of understanding the reality that is designated “absolute idealism”. Using the Greek concept of “dialectic” (Heraclitus), Hegel considers the universe to be immanent to the individual and that the irrational does not exist. On the contrary, everything may be justified by the rational progression of the Idea: although it may appear irrational and contradictory, it is not more than an antithetic aspect of reality, which would then turn to rationality, seen at a higher level of complexity.

The more conventional opinion gets fixated on the antithesis of truth and falsity, the more it tends to expect a given philosophical system to be either accepted or contradicted; and hence it finds only acceptance or rejection. It does not comprehend the diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive unfolding of truth, but rather sees in it simple disagreements. The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one might say that the latter refutes the former; similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another; they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole.

(Hegel 1977, p. 2)

Similarly, according to Hegel, history itself is no more than the development of the Idea in a progressive moment of becoming conscious of the self. In other words, all facts can be rationally explained, from the dialectic development of the idea and the contradictions, struggles
and oppositions are merely apparently, although necessary. Thus, the
true motor of History is Reason, the Idea or the Spirit. In the words of
Hegel,

reason is purposive activity. The exaltation of a supposed Nature over a
misconceived thinking, and especially the rejection of external teleology,
has brought the form of purpose in general, into discredit. Still, in the sense
in which Aristotle, too, defines Nature as purposive activity, purpose is
what is immediate and at rest, the unmoved which is also self-moving, and
as such it is Subject.

(1977, p. 12)

Effectively, the importance of Hegel for Western thought is precisely due
to its integrating Cartesian rationalism (the idea of the rationality of the
real), Kantian criticism (the transcendental logic that considers the sub-
ject to reside in pure conditions before knowledge) in addition to Fichte
(in his version of the dialectic movement) and Schelling (in relation to
objective idealism).

Recognised today as one of the last philosophers to construct a sys-
tem which aimed to explain and rationalise, and although he had a great
deal of influence in the twentieth century, in Marxist and existentialist
theories, for example, the truth is that the response elicited was the emer-
gence of theories which challenged reason, opening the door for all kinds
of intuitionistic and irrationalistic philosophies. Of these, we highlight
that of Nietzsche, one of the most profound and radical contesters to
the absolute idealism of Hegel. Thus, to analyse Nietzsche and Hegel in
light of each other allow a deeper understanding of the two great theo-
retical lines developed throughout the twentieth century: one Hegelian,
idealistic and even hyper-rationalistic; and the other Nietzschean, anti-
rationalistic, intuitionistic and even irrationalistic, both of which form
the basis for our current postmodernity. Each has entirely different modes
of understanding relations between leisure and work in contemporary
culture.

The Slave–Lord Dialectic: The Problem
of Recognition

The separation between leisure and work implies a differentiation
between forms of using time that is fundamental to self-consciousness
in Hegel, that is, for the whole process of individuation and the forma-
tion of identity according to Hegelian thought. Indeed, work appears in
Hegel as the mediator between self-consciousness and what is outside it,
a consciousness which is separated and distinguished from the objective
world by the objective conditions of its action in it, that is, according to
its relationship with life and freedom as a Lord or a Slave.

To speak of work and of leisure in Hegel implies speaking of subjec-
tivity and recognition. This is because the relation with work—and due
to its opposition with leisure—is central to the process of subjectivity in
Hegelian philosophy. But, in order for us to understand subjectivity in
Hegel, we must also understand recognition.

The process of separation and distinction of the consciousness of the
self from that which is outside it is the heart of the formation of the sub-
ject in Hegel. It is therefore a process of subjectivity that, put simply, may
be described as the process of differentiation between the subject and
things. Subjectivity may only exist when self-consciousness becomes self-
conscious, becoming a self-consciousness of the self and for the self—in
other words, a subject. However, that process, in the Hegelian dialectic,
may not occur without the recognition of self-consciousness for another
consciousness of the self. That is, there is neither subjectivity nor separa-
tion between the conscience and things, without the recognition of this
subjectivity of the other, for another self-consciousness.

In the words of Jean Hyppolite:

The separated self-consciousnesses are primarily foreign to each other, and
then enter in opposition; in the end, one dominates the other, a fundamen-
tal phenomenon in the development of the self. A dialectic: bonded domi-
nation leads to the recognition of the unit of self-consciousnesses (...).
Indeed, Hegel recalls the etymology of servus. The Slave is whom has been
saved (servare), in other words, he that prefers life to liberty, and thus has
been saved by grace. The Lord, on the contrary, did not fear death, and showed himself to be independent in his relationship with life.¹

(1941, p. 155)

Recognition, in the Hegelian dialectic, means the recognition of a self-consciousness separate from things, that is of a subject, for another self-consciousness separate from things, that is, another subject. It is in the relation between the Lord and the Slave and in the relation between each of them and the world of things and of work that transforms that which comprises, in Hegelian philosophy, the entire process of subjectivity and of recognition, thus the dialectic of the Lord and of the Slave are vital for the constitution of the Hegelian subject, a self-conscious individuality that may only exist when it is recognised by another self-conscious individuality. Throughout the text, we will examine how this dialectic can be unravelled and its consequences for thought about work and leisure.

Thus, for Hegel, the relationship with work is central to recognition and simultaneously supports the conception of the Hegelian subject, "self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged" (1977, p. 111). Therefore, it is impossible for self-consciousness to free itself from things without recognition of this liberty for another self-consciousness and this recognition is subject to an opposition and a confrontation, after which one chooses risk and the other chooses life. The dialectic between the Lord and the Slave is established, between that which is free and has achieved recognition of his humanity at the expense of having put his life at risk and that which chose to live at the expense of his own humanity.

The Lord relates himself mediately to the bondsman through a being (a thing) that is independent, for it is just this which holds the bondsman in bondage; it is his chain from which he could not break free in the struggle, thus proving himself to be dependent, to possess his independence in thinghood. But the Lord is the power over this thing, for he proved in the struggle that it is something merely negative; since he is the power over this thing and this again is the power over the other (the bondsman), it follows that he holds the other in subjection.

(1977, p. 115)

However, the Lord can only be recognised by and as himself once that which differs from him has been recognised, that is, the Slave. This, however, will never be recognised by the Lord, which means the Lord is recognised by someone he himself does not recognise.

Thus, a contradiction is established and, by dialectical inversion, the Lord becomes a Slave and the Slave becomes Lord, but not by the Lord's recognition of the Slave. Such an inversion is made possible by the relation between the pure desire of the master with the object of desire, as it is not the Lord who works on the object, but the Slave. Therefore, the Slave is the eternal mediator between the Lord and his object of desire, converting him into upon whom the Lord depends. Hence, we turn to Hegel's perspective of work as a basis for recognition and therefore for subjectivity, as observed by Jason Read in a reflection on the contradictions of work in Hegel:

Labour constitutes another basis for recognition. Whereas Hegel's passage on self-consciousness began with a rigid division between appetite and desire, between relations with the world of objects and the world of subjects, desire for things and desire for recognition, the overturning of the relation of Master to Slave obscures this very distinction. What is more important to Hegel is the sharp division between the desire for recognition, what we might want to call intersubjectivity, and the relation with things, than the fundamental negation of one's determinate condition: to be recognized is to be seen as something more than this determinate existence, a point that can be arrived at through the instability of fear and the determination of work as much as it can through recognition. One can arrive at recognition of oneself, an awareness of one's potential, either through the recognition of another or the recognition of oneself in the world transformed by work.

(2013)

Read observes that this Hegelian conception of work as an externalisation of itself, a path to subjectivity, is replaced at a later stage by an

¹Free translation from the original French of a note by Jean Hyppolite in his commented translation of Hegel's work La Phénoménologie de l'Esprit, published in the 1940s.
understanding of work as an internalisation of norms and commands, a
disciplinarian pedagogy capable of making men interchangeable among
themselves, not a particular, expressible self, but a standardised and uni-
versalised self. In the Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel poses the
problem of the impoverishment of the working class and the concentra-
tion of wealth:

When the standard of living of a large mass of people falls below a certain
subsistence level – a level regulated automatically as the one necessary for a
member of the society – and when there is a consequent loss of the sense of
right and wrong, of honesty and the self-respect which makes a man insist
on maintaining himself by his own work and effort, the result is the cre-
ation of a rabble of paupers. At the same time this brings with it, at the
other end of the social scale, conditions which greatly facilitate the concen-
tration of disproportionate wealth in a few hands.

(1967, p. 221)

If in the Phenomenology of Spirit work is the means by which the Slave acts
on the object, establishing the subjectivity of the Lord—in the first stage
dialectic and at a later stage, his own—in the Elements of the Philosophy of
Right, Hegel discusses, in the context of relations between the state and
civil society, work and access to work in the centre of ethics of industrial
societies. Earning a living through work itself appears as an inviolable
principle of civil society and contradicting it would jeopardise the self-
esteeem and self-respect of its members:

When the masses begin to decline into poverty, (a) the burden of main-
taining them at their ordinary standard of living might be directly laid on the
wealthier classes, or they might receive the means of livelihood directly
from other public sources of wealth (e.g. from the endowments of rich
hospitals, monasteries, and other foundations). In either case, however, the
needy would receive subsistence directly, not by means of their work, and
this would violate the principle of civil society and the feeling of individual
independence and self-respect in its individual members.

(Hegel 1967, p. 221)

Thus, in Hegel, we see work as that which gives man his humanity, estab-
lishing it in the dialectic of Lord and Slave and maintaining it within the
ethics of civil society. Work makes the man and preserves him as such,
even whilst the subject that is an external, individual being becomes a
universal and interchangeable being.

The central contradiction of labour of the Philosophy of Right implic-
ates this contradiction between the individual and social dimension of
labour from another angle. Not from the contradiction of its aspect of
externalisation and educational, or expressive and formative aspect, but
its social contradiction between its ethical dimension, the role of labour
in forming habit and character, and its economic aspect, producing
goods. This contradiction comes to light in any attempt to resolve the
problem of unemployment and overproduction that is endemic to civil soci-
ety. Hegel argues that as technology and the division of labour develop,
they necessarily produce a mass of unemployed people, rendered obsolete
by these changes. Examining this obsolete group, what Hegel calls the
rable, brings to light a central contradiction of not only civil society but
also, more importantly, of how work is viewed (Read 2013).

In any case, the dialectic of the Slave and the Lord presents an idea
of work with a creative dimension, able to confer the slave with a cer-
tain freedom, while the Lord himself remains the Slave of unproductive
leisure, from which he is unable to free himself. In the Elements of the
Philosophy of Right (Hegel 1967), the creative dimension of work becomes
a means of maintaining self-esteem. Here, there is no more mention of
individuation or freedom, but conformity to the standard. The worker
cannot be saved, neither by charity nor by state assistance, due to the
risk of losing respect. On the other hand, it is the whole society which
depends on the work of the working class, not only for the objective
production of goods but also to protect the social norm and its ethics. In
this case, liberty is no longer possible unless through the disruption of all
social order, as defended by the so-called “Young Hegelians”, including
Bauer, Feuerbach, Stirner and Marx.

In Hegel, leisure does not appear except as negative to work. This
includes not only slavery and creativity, liberation, but also the social
order, which is desirable to maintain in the process of liberating the spirit.
Pushing away the Hegelian construction's boundaries of subjectivity and society, leisure can almost be glimpsed as a dehumanising force or dissolution. We found a counterpoint in Nietzsche's philosophy, whose moral inverts the dialectics of the Slave and the Lord, denouncing it as a negation of life, a mere reaction instead of action, pure resentment and the denial of desire.

In his scathing and radical questioning of all rationality, Western morals and philosophy, Nietzsche proposes a reversal of values that do not place work, but rather *otium* at the centre of becoming human. A becoming which is not controlled by a previously conceived duty, a becoming without imperatives that does not depend on the other, against "the organising idea, intended to dominate", totalitarian idea that "makes us slowly regress with shortcuts and detours, preparing qualities and skills that will prove one day, as indispensable means of reaching the whole" (Nietzsche 1997a, p. 155).

The criticism of Nietzsche's philosophy and the links between his work and fascism and totalitarianism are well known. We will not bury ourselves in this problem, but maintain the counterpoints of a logical inversion of social values in our sights, starting with the dignity given to leisure rather than to work, with the aim of, by contrast, exposing the normativity of Hegelian ethics and the invisibility of *otium* as opposed to the centrality of work. While work operates in the Lord and the Slave's dialectics, as well as in the philosophy of law, as a device which brings simultaneously subjectivity and subordinating, in Nietzsche², working to earn is to conform to a mediocre and contemptible existence which levels the most civilised men of their era. Complaining about the absence of pride of classical antiquity:

>A Greek of noble birth found, between the height of his position and the last rung of the hierarchy and so many enormous echelons that he could barely see the Slave. Plato himself could no longer fully see him. For us it is different, accustomed as we are to the doctrine of equality. A being who

₁According to Hegelian thought, the Lord's non-working time does not produce anything, not even its own subjectivity. Nietzsche, however, uses the classical terminology *otium*, free time, and in particular for Nietzsche, the free time of the philosophers.

³Slavery is inside every man who conforms, work as a means of subsistence is demeaning, not being afraid of insecurity and of the unknown, welcoming adversity as a favourable condition are inherent to the "best and most fertile men and peoples" (idem). No consciousness frees another consciousness. The Nietzschean Demon challenges each one with the curse of having to relive his own life ad infinitum, "with every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything utterly small and large in your life, and everything in same order and sequence" to throw himself on the ground, grinding his teeth or saying yes to the question "do you want this over and over again without a limit?".

### Desire and Work

Once the dialectical movement in which the Lord/Slave relationship develops has been described, it is important to introduce a new concept: desire. Indeed, for Hegel, desire is the engine of recognition by the other. But this movement is twofold because, on the one hand, the desire for consciousness aims to be recognised in the desire of the other (thereby understanding the autonomy of desire itself), and on the other hand, two desires confront and deny each other in a battle that only ends when one of them turns their desire into repressed desire (the Slave) leaving the Lord to experience a desire that henceforth will be given only to things, objects and the Nature that he cannot resist and that are consumed in the same act of desire:

This Lord and Master of the world holds himself in this way-to be the absolute person, at the same time embracing within himself the whole of existence, the 'person for whom there exists no superior Spirit. [...] Their impotent self-consciousness is the defenceless enclosed arena of their tumult. In this knowledge of himself as the sum and substance of all actual powers, this Lord and Master of the world is the titanic self-consciousness
that thinks of itself as being an actual living god. But since he is only the
formal self who is unable to tame those powers, his activities and self-
enjoyment are equally monstrous excesses.

(Hegel 1977, pp. 292–293)

That movement in which the Lord imposes his desire without restrictions
also prevents him from recognising the desire of another consciousness.
Indeed, the Slave himself becomes a “thing” among other things to the
Lord: “In the moment which corresponds to desire in the lord’s con-
sciousness, it did seem that the aspect of unessential relation to the thing
fell to the lot of the bondsman, since in that relation the thing retained
its independence” (Hegel 1977, p. 118).

On the contrary, the Slave, in suppressing his desire and turning it into
work, acting on the world and transforming it, is now recognised as an
objectified spirit:

Work, on the other hand, is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off; in
other words, work forms and shapes the thing. The negative relation to the
object becomes its form and something permanent, because it is precisely
for the worker that the object has independence. This negative middle term
or the formative activity is at the same time the individuality or pure being-
for-self of consciousness which now, in the work outside of it, acquires an
element of permanence. It is in this way, therefore, that consciousness, qua
worker, comes to see in the independent being of the object its own
independence.

(Hegel 1977, p. 118)

Thus, the Lord presents a relationship with the world and with nature
which is superficial and merely consumerist. On the contrary, through
work, the slave maintains a dialectical relationship of opposition and rec-
ognition before the world.

Through this rediscovery of himself by himself, the bondsman realizes that
it is precisely in his work wherein he seemed to have only an alienated
existence that he acquires a mind of his own. For this reflection, the two
moments of fear and service as such, as also that of formative activity, are
necessary, both being at the same time in a universal mode.

(Hegel 1977, pp. 118–119)

Therefore, it becomes absolutely clear how Hegel promotes the apprecia-
tion of work at the expense of a spontaneous and uncompromised rela-
tionship with the world, for which desire propels the subject.

It would also be on the basis of this particular interpretation of the
relationship between work and leisure/the non-committed relationship
with the world/the abandonment of desire, that whole Marxist theory
formed the possibility of emancipating the workers for their progres-
sive grasp of self-awareness that repressed desire transformed into work
permits in accordance with The Phenomenology of Spirit: “Through work,
however, the bondsman becomes conscious of what he truly is” (Hegel

Thus, if we wish to proceed with the counterpoint between the phil-
osophies of Nietzsche and Hegel that we have sketched regarding the
purpose of leisure and work concepts, there is nothing better than repro-
ducing his own words, in an excerpt included in The Gay Science and
symptomatically entitled “Work and Boredom”:

There are men, although they are rare, who would rather die than work at
something without pleasure. They are demanding people, difficult to satis-
ify, who are not content with a considerable gain if the work is not the
greatest gain. This rare genre is not only of artists and contemplatives of all
kinds but also of the idle who spend their lives hunting, travelling or
involved in love or adventures. They all want to work and poverty, once it
is associated with pleasure, and even work that is harder or more painful, if
necessary (...). They have less fear of boredom than of work without
pleasure.

(Nietzsche 1996a, pp. 54–55)

In fact, it is in the context of a “transmutation of values” that all of
Nietzsche’s philosophy operates, beginning with the value of work and
of leisure. Considering that the Lord (ultimately, the Superman) is the
model which all the working “Slaves” that Hegel tells us of must emu-
late, he proposes an approach that exceeds the Good/Evil dichotomy on
which Christian and Socratic morals were based, building Western cul-
ture and Western man.
In the same passage of *The Gay Science*, the author explains the conception of time and temporality, which distinguishes the Eastern from the European:

For the thinker, as for all sensitive spirits, boredom is that disagreeable "lull" of the soul that precedes the blissful journey and jovial breezes. They must tolerate the lull and await its effect. That is exactly what mediocre natures can not achieve for themselves! Keep boredom away at any price, is something as common as work without pleasure. Maybe this is what distinguishes the Asians from the Europeans — that they are capable of a longer and more profound rest. Even their narcotics operate slowly, in contrast to the disgusting rapidity of the European poison — alcohol.

(Nietzsche 1996a, p. 55)

Hence, the relationship between work and desire in Nietzsche is inverted, and constantly appeals to the value of instincts and to the aristocratic man, who despises work as an absolute value, but affirms life, thus reversing the Hegelian Slave/Lord dialectics, in considering the moral of the Slave to be a moral of resentment, of the denial of desire, the no to life, which does not act, but only reacts (Nietzsche 1997b, p. 35).

And, in a very irreverent manner, and in open opposition to modern rationality in relation to the conception of leisure and work in Hegel, defiantly concludes:

I think of otium with a good conscience, transmitted by heredity and by blood, thus the aristocratic sense whereby work dishonours, is not entirely strange, in that it connects the body and the soul. Consequently, for the soul, it is the noisy modern concern for work, which counts time, which prides itself to the point of stupidity, which, more than anything else educates and prepares precisely for "disbelief".

(Nietzsche 1996b, p.77)

**Conclusion**

Work, much more so than leisure, occupies a prominent place in Hegelian thought. The unproductive leisure of the Lord is not sufficient for him to become subject, self-conscious of himself and for himself. Only the work of the Slave is action in the world, capable of differentiating, individualising, subjectivising, creating identities. Mediator between man and the objective world, work establishes humanity through the separation of the human from the object. This process also separates the free man from the Slave, but the distance between the free man and action about nature, about the world of things, which belongs to the Slave, through dialectical reversal, converts the latter into Lord and the former into Slave.

The Hegelian dialectic—which was a strong influence throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries on the thought of philosophers and left-thinking intellectuals for whom the liberation of the working class from the yoke of work for the reproduction of capital—leaves aside the potential liberation of imagining a world in which the individual’s subjectivity, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and later, their dignity, in the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* could be achieved by means other than the subjection of other individuals or the individual himself. Humanity can be reached through becoming a Lord; but to be a Lord, first it is necessary to be a Slave. Slavery is the path to freedom, and being a Slave means being one that works, but being the master does not imply being free but rather being slave to another's work.

Similarly, earning a living through work itself is to maintain dignity. Here, work, more than wealth, becomes the mainstay of society. As Hegel tells us, however rich a nation, it will never be rich enough to suppress work. Interestingly, this idea appears not infrequently in a certain discourse aligned with the neoliberal policies that condemn social rights acquired by employees and that the state is required to provide and guarantee, such as healthcare, universal education, minimum wage, retirement due to age or disability. Furthermore, perhaps we can reflect on the right to employment, in the context of globalised and automated societies, where it is often lacking on the one hand, while on the other, it is no longer necessary. As already explained by Hegel in the nineteenth century, it simultaneously concentrates income, the product of work, in a few hands (guarding, of course, the proper proportions, since in the globalised economy of societies living in the present acceleration of time and the compression of space due to the advancement of technology, capital not only focuses but also dilutes and volatilises, as concrete relations are diluted between one who works and the one who receives the profits).
In Gorz (2013), the right to leisure appears as a right that should be as structuring as the right to work, just as Lafargue (2011) draws attention to the devaluation of human time which is not devoted to work. In contemporary societies, we see ourselves within a logic that continually validates or invalidates human time according to their productivity or non-productivity. One must produce, consume, keep running on the system’s wheel.

We must ask whether the Nietzschean rebellion in his refusal of work as a means of subjectivity might not be more fertile in the quest for a humanity beyond the slavery of work, to light an alternative path, perhaps not the path of the superman but the path of a subjectivity constituted without Lords or Slaves.

References


John Dewey: Purposeful Play as Leisure

Mary C. Breunig

The Silver Airways prop plane provided a breathtaking view of crystalline blue and turquoise waters interspersed with island (keys) as I flew into the small airport on my first visit to Key West in February 2015. A sign welcoming me to the Conch Republic greeted me upon my arrival as I entered the small terminal. I had just landed at the Southernmost point in the United States, situated only 90 miles from the Republic of Cuba. The Conch Republic (República de la Concha) is a micronation declared as a tongue-in-cheek secession (attempt) by the city of Key West, Florida, from the United States on April 3, 1982. Today, the name is predominantly maintained as a boost for tourism with the organization, a “Sovereign State of Mind” continuing to celebrate “Independence Day,” seeking to bring more “Humor, Warmth and Respect” to a world in sore need of all three, according to their website. Artists Winslow Homer and Mario Sanchez lived and painted in Key West. James John Audubon

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